We explore a political-economy model of labor subsidies, extending Meltzer and Richard's median-voter model to a dynamic setting. We explore only one source of heterogeneity: initial wealth. As a consequence, given an operative wealth effect, poorer agents work harder, and if the agent with median wealth is poorer than average, a politico-economic equilibrium will feature a subsidy to labor. The dynamic model does not have capital, but it has perfect markets for borrowing and lending. This means that another channel appears: tax rates influence interest rates, and this is another channel for redistribution, since a decrease in current interest rates favors agents with below-average wealth.
Introduction
In this paper we analyze a dynasty model where there is endogenous redistribution between consumers of different wealth types: agents vote on labor income tax rates-with associated equal-percapita lump-sum transfers-in every period. The setting is a dynamic version of setting similar to that analyzed in Meltzer and Richard (1987) : labor is the only input of production, intertemporal markets operate, and the political aggregation mechanism is majority voting. Unlike in Meltzer and Richard's model, where workers' productivities differ, we focus on heterogeneity in wealth. We define politico-economic equilibria to be Markov-perfect, i.e., such that the state of the economy consists of payoff-relevant information only (see, e.g., Maskin and Tirole (2001) ). Our approach precludes the study of the possible role of "reputation" in influencing political outcomes, whereby voters would collectively make their current voting behavior depend on historical voting/policy outcomes (see, e.g., Bernheim and Nataraj (2002) ).
Motivation for the present study can be found on two levels. On a general level, we think it is important to develop methods for analyzing quantitatively suitable positive models of macroeconomic policy making. Such models are, almost by definition, complex, especially since they involve both economic and political dynamics, and it therefore seems important to develop more theoretical and computational tools for analyzing them. For models that are quantitatively satisfactory, especially, it is inherently difficult to obtain closed-form solutions. For example, it is difficult to incorporate interest-rate endogeneity; in Hassler, Rodriguez-Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003) and related papers, linear-quadratic settings are utilized, in Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , the dynamics are forward-looking only to a very limited extent; and although Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1999) has an endogenous interest rate, the analysis relies heavily on numerical characterization of equilibrium. The present paper focuses on the endogeneity of interest rates in what may be the simplest possible way: by excluding capital, and by only considering wealth heterogeneity.
1
On a methodological level, the present paper fills three gaps. First, we provide an aggregation result that is useful for further analysis of this kind of model: Markov-perfect equilibrium outcomes which arise as limits of finite-horizon equilibria depend on the the median asset holdings, and on nothing else. This result is useful because it simplifies both the theoretical and numerical analysis. The intuition behind it is straightforward: with preferences that allow aggregation (for simplicity, we look at constant-elasticity-of-intertemporal-substitution preferences here), so long as taxes do not depend on anything but median wealth, neither can prices nor aggregate quantities: marginal propensities to save and work are equal across all consumers, so aggregates can be arrived at by summing up across individuals; moreover, the propensities cannot depend on higher moments through taxes, since taxes cannot depend on any other other moments by backwards induction.
Second, we derive explicit first-order conditions for the median voter. These conditions are significantly more complex, both conceptually and mathematically, than standard first-order conditions from optimal control theory. The first-order condition expresses the tradeoffs the median voter is facing: the marginal benefits and costs of changes in income taxes. We show that these tradeoffs can be expressed in terms of a distortion to the labor-leisure choices-a wedge, or "gap"-on the one hand and net transfer effects on the other. The way in which the gap and transfer effects enter the first-order condition is not a priori obvious. For example, gaps in two consecutive time-periods are involved, as opposed to two in the typical control theory case. Moreover, the way in which they are weighted depends on the "reaction function", or decision rule, of future median voters, so these weights are endogenous. Mathematically, the condition is different than in optimal control theory precisely because of the role of these decision rules: derivatives of decision rules appear in the firstorder condition. This is to be expected, since we are studying a dynamic game without commitment: the median voter at a point in time cannot bind the hands of future median voters, whether the latter are different individuals or not. In the context of this setting, interest-rate manipulation is the culprit. For a simple parametric example of our model, the commitment solution prescribes, from next period and on: constant interest rates, equal to the discount rate, and constant tax rates, equal to zero. In the first period, however, labor subsidies are called for, and the initial interest rate as a result becomes lower than the discount rate. Thus, at each point in time, there is an incentive to deviate from this plan and decrease the interest rate temporarily and later keep it constant at the higher rate. Without commitment, a rational median voter therefore needs to take into account how future voters respond to current policy choices, and because the lack of commitment is binding these effects cannot be ignored: the envelope theorem does not apply. Prior analysis focusing on firstorder conditions in similar contexts include the work on individual saving under time-inconsistent preferences, where reminiscent first-order conditions have been derived (so-called "generalized Euler equations"; see Laibson (1997) ), and some recent work on dynamic public finance (e.g., see Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2003) ).
Numerical solution of models of the kind studied in this paper is not straightforward. Steady states are impossible to find the way steady states are found in growth models with exogenous policy, because the level of capital (in this case, the wealth of the median agent) and the tax rate on income depend, via the first-order condition of the median voter, on the derivatives of the equilibrium decision rules. This means that one cannot specify a finite set of equations in levels only: levels depend on decision rule derivatives, which in turn depend on higher-order derivatives of these same decision rules. One approach for computation is to specify decision rules of some flexible parameterized functional form over some domain and evaluate all the equilibrium conditions, including first-order condition of the median voter, on this domain. Thus, one can iterate on the parameters of the functions in order to meet some criterion. Alternatively, on can employ an approach suggested in Krusell and Smith (2003) and later applied elsewhere which is fast and which allows a systematic search over all possible steady states.
2 This method, which builds on approximating the decision rules with polynomials evaluated at the steady-state point only, generates more equilibrium conditions-which are expressed as functional equations (the unknown decision rules being the unknowns and their arguments being median wealth)-by successive differentiation and evaluation of these conditions at steady state.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic framework and defines equilibrium using recursive methods. Section 3 then defines a recursive equilibrium based on aggregation: it makes formal the dependence of outcomes on only the median of the wealth distribution. In Section 4, the first-order condition from the median voter's tax problem is derived and discussed, and computational methods are then covered in Section ??. A parametric example is then analyzed in Section 5 both in an infinite-horizon and a finite-horizon context. Section 6 (to be added) concludes the paper.
The model
We build up our setup step by step, first describing the physical environment, then introducing the decentralized equilibrium. We first define equilibria sequentially for given, exogenous sequences of tax rates and transfers and we then move to a recursive definition of equilibrium and, finally, to the definition of a politico-economic equilibrium.
A neoclassical growth setup with endogenous labor
In this infinite horizon economy, time is discrete and there is no uncertainty. Agents value consumption, c, and leisure, l, and preferences are the same for everyone:
Agents can trade one period bonds, that promise one unit of consumption next period. The heterogeneity within the population will only come through differences in their initial asset holdings. We will for simplicity assume that the number of "types" is finite with measure µ i for type i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I}. Population size is normalized to one:
Production takes place according to a stationary production function which depends linearly on labor: Y = bN (we use capital letters to denote aggregates). Output is used for consumption, and there is no government consumption or investment. We also abstract from capital, to make the analysis more transparent The level of asset holdings of individual i is denoted by a i , which is in zero net supply in equilibrium (this can be interpreted as assuming that there is no international bond markets).
There is a constraint on the amount of time for each agent: each consumer has one unit, so that l i + n i = 1 for all i. We will make assumptions on primitives so that agents' decision problems are strictly concave; hence, all agents of the same type will make the same decisions and we can also write L i +N i = 1, where L i and N i reflect common decisions regarding leisure and labor of all agents of type i. The aggregate labor input is thus
Equilibrium for exogenous government policy: a sequential formulation
In a decentralized economy, consumers buy consumption goods at each point in time and sell their labor services to firms under perfect competition. There are two relevant prices determined in equilibrium: the price of one-period bonds, denoted by q, and the wage rate w, both measured in terms of consumption goods in the same period. In addition, we now consider a government which taxes labor income at a proportional rate τ t in period t and makes equal lump-sum transfers T t back to all consumers under a balanced budget. Thus, a typical consumer i's budget constraint in period t reads
In equilibrium, consumers' holdings of assets have to add up to zero:
, where A it denotes the total holdings of agents of type i. Consumer heterogeneity thus originates in a i0 = a j0 for all i = j. We define a competitive equilibrium for a given sequence of government policy as follows:
together with a sequence of allocations
for all t, with a 0 = A i0 .
For all t, w t = b.

For all t, N
t = I i=1 µ i (1 − L it ).
For all t,
Of course, such a competitive equilibrium does not exist other than for some policy choices, since the government budget needs to balance. We turn next to a recursive definition of equilibrium.
Recursive equilibrium given exogenous government policy rules
We now define recursive competitive equilibria. These involve decision rules for savings and leisure of each of the types of agents as a function of the state variable of the economy: the distribution of asset holdings, which we denote A ≡ (A 1 , . . . , A I ). Thus let H(a, A) be a function specifying the law of motion of the asset holding of an individual agent with beginning-of-period holdings a: a = H(a, A) (primes denote next-period values). Similarly, we let the leisure choice of a given agent be L(a, A), with the associated aggregate labor supply function N (A).
To specify government policy, we will need to view them as specified by functions of the state of the economy. Thus, let Ψ(A) be the tax rate on income imposed by the government. The function for transfers, T (A), can be specified residually to obey government budget balance.
Definition 2 A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of functions
, and T (A) with the following properties.
In this setup, we will presume that the ranking of asset between types stays the same over time. This follows rather straightforwardly from assuming normal goods, so that a higher asset holding in a given period translates into higher asset holdings (and thus more consumption) for the future as well. This would be reflected in H being strictly increasing in its first argument. If one considers heterogeneity in preferences or in labor productivity, this result will no longer necessarily hold, and the asset ranking can change over time.
Endogenous policy: recursive majority-voting equilibrium
We now define a Markov-perfect equilibrium by requiring that the government policy function Ψ be the preferred choice by the agent whose asset holdings are in the 50th percentile of the distribution. This definition, in order to make sense as an outcome of pairwise voting contests between alternative tax policies, requires voters' indirect utility functions over the policy variable to be single-peaked. Single-peakedness is hard to verify for a general environment, and we will use numerical methods for this in applied contexts.
As in Krusell-Ríos-Rull (1999), we define equilibrium by characterizing one-period deviations from the policy rule Ψ(A): in the current period, the tax rate is τ , whereas all future tax rates are given by the rule Ψ, evaluated at the asset distributions that will result from current taxation at τ . We do this in order to be able to state the median voter's problem: the median voter needs to consider all possible current τ values, and their associated competitive equilibria, in order to see which one is best. The political equilibrium will then require that Ψ(A) is the best among all policies τ , for all A. To define behavior in the one-period deviations we add the argument τ and tildes to all associated functions. The resulting equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 3 A recursive competitive equilibrium with a one-period tax deviation is a set of functions
with the following properties.
3.H andL attain the argmax above.
Here, note that the deviation equilibrium will satisfy
We can now state a definition of a Markov-perfect median-voter equilibrium. Let m denote the median type; A m is thus the median asset holding.
, and T (A, τ ) which is a recursive competitive equilibrium with a one-period tax deviation and which satisfies the following property:
for all A.
An alternative version of the equilibrium definition
First, one can under some circumstances define the equilibrium more compactly. 3 The idea is that it is possible to represent the private-sector equilibrium conditions simply by a set of first-order conditions. This works when the latter are sufficient for private maximization, as they will be in our application below. Thus, one does not need to obtain individual value functions and decision rules, which depend on both individual and aggregate states, but can instead focus on the functions that determine aggregates. The first-order conditions contain current aggregate state variables, current aggregate control variables (asset accumulation/consumption and leisure decisions), the government's current tax and transfer rates, and the perceived future laws of motion of policies and assets. Thus, one can pose the median voter's problem as choosing a current tax rate to maximize his utility subject to these equilibrium first-order conditions. Because the equilibrium objects are fewer and contain less arguments this way, it is not only much more compact but it also is more suitable for numerical computation. However, it is less transparent and leads to first-order conditions for the median voter that are not easy to interpret unless one first assimilates the definition provided above. To save on space here, we will postpone stating the compact alternative equilibrium definition until the numerical section.
Second, in our application below, we will also restrict attention further, namely, to differentiable Markov-perfect equilibria. This restriction is used for substantive and for computational reasons. Substantively, it is a way of ruling out Markov-perfect equilibria that capture features of reputation through discontinuous decision rules; since our focus on Markov-perfect equilibria is motivated by a search for the "fundamental" outcome that is a limit of finite-horizon economies, this is thus a desirable refinement. Computationally, it allows us to look at first-order conditions of the median voter's problem, where due to the lack of commitment derivatives of the equilibrium/tax policy decision rules appear.
Aggregation
We will now specialize the utility functions adopted and discuss the issue of aggregation. If u(c, l) is homothetic, then it is well-known that the first-order conditions take a particularly simple form and that, under exogenous, proportional-rate/lump-sum policy, the distribution of asset holdings will not matter for aggregates or prices. 4 However, in this economy the distribution of assets influence policy endogenously, so the question is what aspects of the distribution of asset holdings will matter in this case.
We will suggest an answer to this question. The equilibrium will feature aggregation in the following sense: aggregate actions and prices will depend only on the median of the asset distribution but not on any other of its moments. We argue in two parallel ways. First we use informal arguments based on backwards induction, which point to the aggregation result as a necessary part of any equilibrium (under some conditions). We then define an equilibrium based on the aggregation conjecture and proceed to show that it is consistent with all agents maximizing.
Arguments based on backwards induction from a finite horizon
Our discussion here will be informal. We will argue on the basis of solving finite-horizon economies iteratively backwards, which is what motivated our Markov-perfect equilibrium definition.
Consider the last period, T , of a finite economy. Given a distribution of asset holdings, no matter what the equilibrium tax outcome will be, there is an aggregation theorem. Using homotheticity of the utility function, for any given tax rate, aggregate consumption and leisure decisions, and hence prices, are independent of aggregate asset holdings, because they are in zero net supply. For any tax rate, we assume that the equilibrium is unique, and we can thus compute equilibria and evaluate the utility of different agents. Moreover, since consumers differ in one dimension only-initial asset holdings-a median-voter theorem is applicable given that certain single-crossing conditions are met. Given these, we can thus conclude that the median agent chooses the tax rate so as to maximize the utility implied by starting the period with his-the median-asset holding. In conclusion, the tax rate in the last period could not depend on anything but the median asset holding-since it influences the utility of the median directly and thus his tax choice since it determines prices, given each tax choice. Thus, we can write τ T = Ψ T (A m,T ), where A m is the median asset holding.
Now proceed to period T − 1. Here, we are in a similar situation, with one main difference: there is a future, so not only consumption and leisure decisions but also asset accumulation decisions have to be made. Thus, for any initial asset distribution in period T − 1, we can compute competitive equilibria that are indexed by the current tax rate. These depend nontrivially on what is perceived in the future; in particular they depend on Ψ T . But since we have argued above that Ψ T , and all other future decisions that can influence prices, only depend on the median of the asset holdings carried into the last period, we can repeat the argument made for the very last period in a slightly modified version. That is, for any tax rate chosen in period T − 1, only the median asset holdings can now matter for aggregates. More precisely, from the perspective of period T −1 the median asset holding matters, since it will influence the median asset holding carried into the future, which in turn will influence the tax in period T . The determination of the median asset holding carried into period T , in turn, cannot depend on any other feature of the distribution than the initial median: the median's asset accumulation decision depends on its own starting position and on prices, which do not depend on other moments.
Thus, given that for any current tax rate there is a unique equilibrium of the (T − 1, T ) economy, it will feature dependence of aggregates and prices on nothing but the initial median asset holdings. The uniqueness of this equilibrium cannot be established easily, both because it is well known that sufficiently distorted economies can exhibit multiplicity and because the shape of the function Ψ T can introduce nonlinearities. If there is more than one equilibrium, other moments of the asset distribution than the median can be used for selection among equilibria. In our present context, therefore, we will proceed on the basis of the provision that equilibria of finite-horizon economies are unique. 5 In sum, we will, as in the last period of the economy, obtain the equilibrium tax rate as that rate which maximizes the utility of the median agent:
The argument just made can be extended inductively, and with the final provision-that there is convergence of all equilibrium functions to a set of time-invariant functions-we thus obtain an infinite-horizon recursive equilibrium with endogenous policy. As far as we know, the convergence is not possible to establish with any generality, and we will not even verify it numerically in this paper: we will proceed directly to the candidate infinite-horizon equilibrium.
Finally, we should point out that there are cases in setups similar to the present one where the objective function of the aggregate decision maker (the median voter in this case) becomes sufficiently nonconcave that multiple solutions appear. This will in turn typically give rise to discontinuities in the tax decision rule, thus making a first-order approach hazardous. As an example of this, Krusell, Martin, and Ríos-Rull (2003) show, in the context of an optimal-debt management problem, that there is a Markov-perfect equilibrium for the infinite economy that coincides with the limit of finitehorizon equilibria and which features a countable number of discontinuities in the tax policy rule of the government (and a countable number of stationary points associated with this rule).
Constructing an infinite-horizon equilibrium based on aggregation
Here we will use the "guess-and-verify" approach: we will conjecture that the equilibrium policy function Ψ(A) depends on the median of A only and then proceed to define and characterize an equilibrium based on that. The presence of an aggregation theorem here merely means that the guess will have the necessary internal consistency so as to allow the aggregate decisions for savings and leisure to be consistent with utility maximization of all the I types of agents.
We henceforth abuse notation slightly-comparing with the above definitions-by using A m as argument in the equilibrium functions instead of the whole vector A. In an equilibrium with aggregation, we need to keep account of the relative present-value wealth associated to the mean and median asset holdings; we denote ratio between this measure of wealth for the entire population except the median group to that of the median group with the variable λ in what follows.
6 Because for simplicity we will be using preferences which are homogenous, λ will suffice in determining mean consumption based on knowing median consumption (otherwise, an "intercept" is needed as well). Moreover, we will need to follow the evolution of the present-value wealth of future wage and transfer income, i.e., total present-value wealth less initial asset income; this variable is denoted E in the analysis.
CHECK THIS DEFINITION!!!
Definition 5 A recursive competitive equilibrium (given taxes Ψ(A m )) with aggregation is a set of functions
, and T (A m ) with the following properties.
h m and n m solve, for all
and
where
5 If they are not, it is also possible that "reputation equilibria" can be constructed, along the lines of Benoit and Krishna (1985) . 6 We will assume, for sake of notational simplicity, that the size of the median group is negligible, i.e., that µm = 0.
n(A m ) satisfies, for all
Suppose that we have found a recursive equilibrium with aggregation, i.e., suppose that we have functions that satisfy all the stated conditions. We can then use these functions in order to construct additional functions, specifying behavior and utility of agents with arbitrary asset holdings, that together with the given functions meet all the conditions of the earlier, general definition of a recursive competitive equilibrium. This constitutes our aggregation theorem, which thus reads as follows:
Proposition 6 Given a recursive competitive equilibrium with aggregation, thus satisfying Definition 5,
Let
, and T (A) constitute a recursive competitive equilibrium, i.e., they satisfy Definition 2.
Proof. Note first that the solution for V is well-defined: it is the fixed point of a contraction mapping. Given concavity of the consumer's problem in Definition 2, the first-order conditions, which appear in Definition 5, are sufficient for maximization. The remainder of the proof uses the functional-form version of the first-order conditions, which imply that all consumption goods (consumption and leisure at all points in time) are a constant fraction of net-present value wealth (asset holdings plus the present value of non-asset wealth). This feature allows us to show that if the first-order conditions hold for the median agent-and they do by assumption-they also hold for agents with all other asset levels. The details of the manipulations required to demonstrate this are contained in the appendix.
A similar proposition can be formulated for a recursive competitive equilibrium with aggregation with a one-period tax deviation. The one-period deviation will require functions that depend on τ and these will also satisfy the aggregation property; the proof, moreover, is parallel. A key element of this definition will be the value function of the median voter for a one-period deviation: Ā, τ ) . A more formal definition follows.
Definition 7 The recursive competitive equilibrium with aggregation and a one-period tax deviation is a set of functions
with the following properties:
2.h m andñ m attain the argmax above.
.
constitute a recursive competitive equilibrium with aggregation.
Finally, given a recursive competitive equilibrium with aggregation with a one-period tax deviation, it is straightforward to define a Markov-perfect median voter equilibrium with aggregation. Such an equilibrium thus has as its key requirement that
for all (A m ).
Characterization: first-order conditions
In this section, we derive first-order conditions for the median voter. These are necessary conditions for an equilibrium. They allow us to summarize the fundamental tradeoffs that deliver the policy outcomes in this model. We simply state the conditions here and leave derivations for the appendix.
The median voter chooses the tax rate (τ ) so as to maximize his own utility. In order to do so, he has to take into account how a change in taxes modifies both current labor and savings decisions. 
The gaps
In this model, the costs and benefits of taxing for the median voter are of several kinds. On the cost side, labor income taxes generate well-known distortions to the decisions of the agents, and these are taken into account by the median voter. The distortions to the median agent's labor-leisure decisions are important per se, but the distortions to the behavior of other agents are important only indirectly. The latter influence the provision of inputs, which influence prices, and it is for this reason that the median agent cares about these. This situation is parallel to that considered in Meltzer and Richard's (1991) economy, though we are casting the discussion more directly in terms of distortions here.
On the benefit side, the median agent seeks to use the gap in wealth between himself and the mean agent to obtain transfers. In addition, the effect of taxation is to alter prices of bonds and labor, which also influences the median agent: he may be more or less dependent on one of the sources of income than the mean agent, and thus would stand to benefit from some amount of price distortion.
We will discuss in turn each of the different effects of taxation that are relevant to the median voter. We will thereafter display and discuss the median voter's first-order condition, which weighs these different effects together in a certain way.
There is a wedge in the leisure-labor decision. Under lump-sum taxes the benefits and costs of an extra unit of labor for the individual would be equated, but with the proportional labor income taxation used here the government introduces a positive wedge between them that is equal to τ wU cm .
In particular,
In this economy, where there is wealth heterogeneity among agents, some redistribution will occur through transfers. The median voter chooses taxes taking this into account, which will create an extra distortion absent in representative agent models: the redistribution gap. It is useful to define first the net transfers received by the median voter: it is equal to
where µ m is the measure of median voters (which we assume to be zero in most of the analysis).
Having defined the net transfer, we define the redistribution gap as having two part, the first of which the change in the net transfer when taxes are increased marginally. Thus, this is a direct effect that assumes that prices and quantities remain unchanged. Second, the redistribution gap also has an indirect effect that takes into account the change in individuals' optimal decision rules and their induced effects on the bond price.
As is seen from this expression, the median agent sees a net direct gain from taxation if he is a net borrower. We will assume that median asset holdings are lower than average asset holdings (which are zero in this case). Moreover, the mean agent is richer also in an overall wealth sense, since he only differs from the median agent in his asset holdings (recall that labor productivity, and thus the value of the sequence of time endowments, is equal among agents in the benchmark model). Therefore, if leisure is a normal good, he would buy more leisure and therefore work less than the median agent. This means that the direct effect of taxation is detrimental to the median agent: he loses, on net, by redistribution of labor income.
The indirect effects include a standard, Meltzer-Richard channel: increased redistribution lowers the gap between the median and mean labor supply, because it moves the net-present-value wealth of the two agents closer to each other. In this case, this is an effect in the median's favor, because the labor redistribution channel works against the median. The indirect effects also include the bond price effect: a raised tax would typically lower current work effort (relative to future work effort) and therefore lower q
The median voter's first-order condition: the GEE
We can now derive the median voter's Euler equation. We will refer to this equation, which is a functional equation and thus must hold for all values of the state A m (though this dependence is suppressed in the formula), as the GEE: the Government Euler Equation.
7 This is a necessary condition for an interior, differentiable Markov-perfect equilibrium and it is the key determinant of how high taxes are in this economy.
The algebra involved in arriving at the result is somewhat cumbersome, and we leave it for the appendix. Conceptually, it follows from taking first-order conditions and using the envelope theorem, which holds here since the median voter has the same identity over time. Based on this insight, and as shown in Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2003), it is also possible to derive this equation using variational methods: the median voter keeps the current state and a future state constant and optimally varies control variables in between so as to maximize utility.
The GEE reads
This functional equation expresses the benefit of the median agent from a marginal increase in the current tax rate τ , and it is evaluated at τ = Ψ(A m ), i.e., on the equilibrium path.
The GEE reveals that the median voter's optimal taxation behavior can be thought of as trading off gaps-tax wedges and redistribution gaps-over time. The optimal tax rate is chosen such that the weighted sum of distortions (labor and redistribution) created by such a policy is equal to zero. The weights simply involve the induced changes in behavior, i.e., changes in savings and in labor supply, but their form can be complex. For example, dñ m dτ summarizes the effects through the two arguments ofñ m (A m , τ ) through τ 's effect on savings of the median and through the effects of these variables on next period's tax rate.
The lack of commitment and the fact that only current taxes can be chosen implies that the government today perceives tomorrow's asset holdings to be more elastic than what future governments will. Hence, it has an incentive to strategically influence next period's taxation decision. This effect appears in the GEE but is only visible indirectly: by changing the current tax rate, the current median influences savings, and thus future taxes, in order to change current expectations of consumers. In this class of models, time inconsistency of fiscal policy is limited to the effect on private agents' expectations: if these expectations (which determine current behavior) could be controlled separately, there would be no disagreement between the current and the future governments/median voters. I.e., conditional on arriving at a state (A m ) tomorrow, there is no remaining disagreement.
A parametric example
THIS SECTION NEEDS A LOT OF WORK: COHERENCE WITH THE REST, NOTATION, AND EXPLANATION.
Assume that utility is logarithmic, u(c, l) = α ln c + (1 − α) ln l. In the competitive equilibrium, agents make their decisions taking the tax rule as given, where the tax rule as before depends on A m , the median asset levels.
The commitment problem
The agent's FOC with respect to leisure is:
,
The FOC with respect to asset holdings is c t+1 = c t (β/q t ).
Transfers satisfy:
(we obtain this after performing some algebra in the average agent's FOC and the Govt budget constraint). Simplifying, we obtain
We can guess and verify that
which implies that
The commitment problem reads
Let λ t be the multiplier of the constraint. The FOC follow
Using these two equations we obtain the following, ∀t > 0
Using the form of f (τ ), we obtain that τ t = 0 ∀t > 0.
Let's now focus on t = 0. The FOC are
But since f (τ 2 ) = f (τ 1 ) = 1 and c 1 = 1 + a 1 (1 − β) (we are using the result that taxes are zero from tomorrow on) then
We also know that a 1 = a 0 f (τ 0 ) and a t = a 1 ∀t > 1 and the formula above to write
The transversality condition is lim
This yields that
I was not very careful with the bs so I might miss one or two. This is basically the same equation that Per derived. Now we can try to understand how this commitment problem behaves. We know that taxes in period zero are going to be a function of initial assets. Assuming that the agent has debt and under the parameters β = 0.9, α = 0.2, = 1, I've calculated consumption, asset holdings and taxes for different levels of initial a 0 . PROBLEM: WE USE α = 0. 3 Notice that subsidies are used to reduce inequality. The economy can start with relatively high initial inequality, but after the first period the gap between mean and median is reduced (and the reduction is bigger the poorer the agent is).
IN ALL THE OTHER EXAMPLES, SO WE SHOULD MODIFY THESE GRAPHS FOR CONSISTENCY
We can also (trivially) calculate welfare, that increases with a 0 , as expected. 
Markov-perfect equilibrium
Due to the stationarity of the problem, the conjecture is that A m will be constant over time, from the beginning of time, and part of this guess is that the tax rate chosen by the median voter will be constant over time, and that interest rate will be constant and equal to β. This is, of course, what is conjectured to happen in a political equilibrium. A one-period deviation, on the other hand, will feature a tax rate τ in the current period and a tax rate τ in the next period and every period thereafter the tax rate will also be τ :
, and so on. The question is: what will the function Ψ(A m ) look like? To find out, we need to solve for a one-period-deviation equilibrium.
NOTATION IS INCONSISTENT!! USE A m INSTEAD OF a
First, what is the stationary equilibrium given an arbitrary Ψ(τ )? So just consider a constant τ . Because the mean agent does not have net assets, and because interest rates will be constant over time, net wealth will be the same over time, and so labor supply of the mean agent, and consumption, can be determined by a static problem. The first-order condition is
where b is the before-tax wage rate (recall that output is linear in labor: y = bN ). Combining this with the budget constraint (where assets are assumed to be zero because they have to be in equilibrium)c
and with the government budget constraint,
one obtains with some algebra thatl
This allows us to find T , which is relevant in the median voter's problem:
revealing a Laffer curve, not surprisingly. Thus we can define T (τ ) to be the transfer given an arbitrary τ . Now note, importantly, that this function also applies in an equilibrium where taxes change over time, such as in a one-period deviation equilibrium, because all the equations remain the same (the average agent has to have zero asset holdings in any equilibrium). Now consider the median voter: the consumer with median asset holdings. Let us consider a one-period deviation. Variables without bars now, for notational simplicity, refer to those of the median agent. We have the following equations (FOCs for labor, budgets, and intertemporal Euler equation): 
and where T = T (τ ) and T = T (τ ). Notice that we have set a = a , and q = β: that is crucial, and follows from the guess that in a political equilibrium, everything is constant (so a one-period deviation is just different in the first period and constant thereafter). The equations above are 5, and there are 5 unknowns: c, c , l, l , and a . The tax rate is given, and so is a (the initial asset holding of the median agent). So I solved the system for what I view as the key variable, a , and found important simplifications: I obtained
Thus, given Ψ, this equation solves (numerically, since I don't think Ψ has a nice closed form) for a , and thus we get a =H(a, τ ), which is crucial in the median voter's problem. Also, we thus havẽ
Can you check this, and try to reproduce the algebra, or verify directly that my guess satisfies all the equations?
The median voter's problem is therefore as follows.
This can be expressed in a somewhat more explicit way: let
Then we can state the median voter's problem as follows:
We can then think of the last constraint as an implementation constraint. However, note that the solution to this problem, for the equilibrium to be Markov-perfect, has to satisfy τ = Ψ(a). That is, this is a nontrivial fixed-point problem, and not the usual contraction mapping. Working out the problem in more detail, we have, if we ignore constants that are irrelevant to the maximization,
Notice that the objective now only contains a as an argument of Ψ; nevertheless, to find Ψ(a ), one needs to use the implementability constraint: one needs to solve for a as a function of τ and a-this, formally, isH(a, τ )-and then evaluate Ψ at this value for a . The objective can be simplified and turns out to be proportional to
We can now derive a first-order necessary condition using the assumption that Ψ is differentiable. It reads
where, as before, a is given by the implementation constraint and whereH 2 (a, τ ) is given by implicit differentiation of the implementation constraint:
In a differentiable Markov-perfect equilibrium, this condition needs to deliver τ = Ψ(a): that is a condition for Ψ to constitute a fixed point. Moreover, a will equal a in the equilibrium construction. Therefore, we can state a functional equation in Ψ by imposing these conditions, resulting in the following:
This functional equation determines Ψ as a function of a: Ψ has to be such that the equality is met for all values of a. A simplification of the last square bracket in this expression delivers a functional equation that reads
We see that, since Ψ(a) < ∞) is assumed, a = 0 implies that the only feasible solution to this equation is τ = 0. I.e., if the consumer with median asset holdings has 0 assets, i.e., if the median equals the mean, then taxes are zero. This is also true in the corresponding static model, and is not a surprise, but it For intuition, note that whether a tax increase (or a decrease in the subsidy) raises or lowers the asset holdings of the median agent, one needs to know what the equilibrium value ofH 2 is. It is given byH
Similarly, whether a unit increase in current taxes away from the equilibrium value-for some given a-increases future taxes more or less than a unit, one needs to knowH 2 Ψ . It becomes
which is less than 1 for a < 0, so long as (i) Ψ (a) > 0 and (ii) (1−Ψ(a))(1−αΨ(a))+(1−α)aΨ (a) > 0. We expect the former condition to hold: a median agent who is poorer than the mean works more and thus wants to subsidize labor. Regarding condition (ii), it is clear that it will be met for values of a close enough to zero. If both conditions are met, thus, focusing on the case a < 0, a smaller subsidy leads to a somewhat smaller decrease in future subsidies. Since q is decreasing in τ , but symmetrically increasing in τ at a point where τ = τ , the former effect will thus dominate: q will decrease, and hence a will decrease, given that a = (β/q)a and a < 0. That is, an increase in τ makes the median's asset holdings move further away from 0, i.e., further from mean asset holdings. Conversely, if an asset-poor median increases the subsidies on labor, thus redistributing toward the median, the median's future asset holdings will increase relative to the mean. We display a numerically computed equilibrium tax function for illustration; all the conjectured properties are borne out. We will solve the problem backwards. In the last period (t = 1), the agent has to pay back the debt, so a 2 = 0. The agent's optimal decisions given taxes in the competitive equilibrium are:
where f (τ ) = The optimal tax in the last period, which we can denote by Ψ(a m1 ) is then
You can immediately see that if a m1 =0, then τ 1 = 0. So if the median has no debt it has no incentives to distort labor decisions. Now that we know taxes and decision rules in the second period, we can move back to the first period and analyze what taxes will be at that point. The relevant optimal decisions in the initial period are:
with the price given by q = β
and asset holdings satisfying
Notice that the equation above defines the amount of debt that the median wants to hold only implicitly, since taxes in the future depend on it. Moreover, equation (2) defines taxes only implicitly as well. After some manipulation we can find taxes as a function of initial capital and asset holdings:
Just on a side note, notice that Ψ 1 = 1. The first thing to notice is that this function is single-peaked, which verifies that the median voter theorem holds in this environment (I don't know if we showed that it holds in this case).
2. We can see that the poorer the median, the larger the size of subsidy to labor. Explain intuition.
3. When median=mean, no distortions, taxes=0. As you can see when a 0 = 0, a 1 = 0, taxes in both periods are 0, and q = β. When a0 < 0, we have subsidies in both periods, larger in the first than in the second period, and the debt of the median reduces about a half. q is larger than β, being even larger than 1 (negative interest rate).
We need to discuss why q as a function of a0, does not increase monotonically. Also notice that consumption mimics the shape of q (but not leisure). 
A three-period economy
The 3-period environment is a straightforward extension of what was described above. There is production in all three periods, with the same technology, and capital can be accumulated in the usual neoclassical fashion. First-period output can be either consumed directly or installed as second-period capital, and so on. Feasibility in this economy is summarized as follows. Utility is assumed to be time-additive and stationary for simplicity:
The competitive environment will be discussed next.
Exogenous taxes in the first period
In the model with fully endogenous taxes presented below, we will assume that taxes in period t are voted on in period t, for t = 1, 2, 3. That is, in period 1, the median voter cannot commit to a period-2 or a period-3 tax rate. This means that in period 1, the median voter has to consider two effects of his choice of a τ 1 : (i) the effect on current utility and (ii) the effect on capital accumulation and, thus, on period-2 utility. The second of these effects, moreover, involves how τ 2 will change in response to a change in the period-2 state variable induced by the choice of τ 1 in period 1, and how this will affect τ 3 .in response to a change in the period-3 state variable induced by the choice of τ 2 .
We will immediately restrict attention to a homothetic utility function u(c, l), as above, since this allows us to write the second-period outcome for tax rates as a function of A 2m only: τ 2 = Ψ 2 (A 2m ), and τ 3 = Ψ 3 (A 3m ). The functions Ψ 2 and Ψ 3 thus summarizes the endogenous tax-determination mechanism described before. Similarly, we can summarize utility outcomes in the second period with value functions where the aggregate state is A 2m , and we can summarize aggregate equilibrium labor decisions with N 2 (A 2m ), and aggregate equilibrium transfers with T 2 (A 2m ), as defined above.
We begin by discussing the 3-period economy with an exogenously given first-period tax rate τ 1 , along with the given initial asset distribution, (A 1i ) i . Thus, we can define a competitive equilibrium in the three-period model recursively: we define equilibrium for any given τ 1 and an endogenously determined τ 2 and τ 3 .
Given a policy τ 1 , a competitive equilibrium for period 1 of a 3-period economy is a set of prices (w 1 , q) together with an allocation (N 1 , T 1 , (C 1i , A 1i , L i , A 2i ) i ) satisfying the following conditions.
For all
and V (a , A 2m ) is the appropriate indirect utility function for period 2, i.e.,
where N 2 , q and T 2 are equilibrium functions, as solved for in a 2-period economy, and V 1 is the equilibrium value function, as solved for in a 1-period economy.
Politico-economic equilibrium
We can now state the following definition.
Given (A 1i ) i , a median-voter equilibrium in the 3-period economy is
• a τ * 2 , and τ * 3 which are a median-voter equilibria, as defined above, for (A * 2i ) i and (A * 3i ) i .
The median voter's first-order conditions
The problem faced by the second and third period's median voter is analogous to the one presented for the two and the one-period economy. Since the economy only lasts three periods, and given the level of A m3 , the trade-offs faced are exactly the same than those faced in the static case. We can solve for the implied tax function in period three by using the GEE presented in the one-priod model, which as discussed above will take the form Ψ 3 (A m3 ).
The median voter in the first period chooses taxes taking into account how the winners of the next elections-his future selves in this case-will choose taxes tomorrow and the period after (the Ψ 2 and Ψ 3 functions). Therefore, when finding the optimal level for τ 1 , he must consider how this will affect his current decision about next period assets holdings (positive or negative), (summarized by the functionsH m ), which by modifying the level of assets that the next incumbent inherits will influence next period's economic as well as political (tax) outcomes.
Like in the two-period economy, the median voter will trade off distortions away from the firstbest-gaps-that are introduced by redistributive policies. There are a larger number of distortions in a 3-period economy than in a 1-period economy. The final result is a first-order condition for the median voter in the first period-a "generalized Euler equation", or GEE-that can be written as a weighted sum of gaps that involve wedges in all three periods:
The derivation is straightforward. An increase in the subsidy (τ 1 ) will, first, increase labor supply in the first period which has a per-unit cost of GAP 1n : the static labor-leisure distortion (recall that the gaps are distortions from the perspective of the median agent). Second, it has a static redistributive gain like that discussed before: GAP 1red . Third, by changing the assets carried out to tomorrow-since more time will be spent working and debt under our assumptions will be decreasing in income/wealth:
< 0 (so larger subsidies allow for larger cuts in the level of debt)-the median agent today will be able to affect taxes tomorrow through the inherited A 2m in Ψ 2 ( A 2m ). 
These graphs come from the program ThreePeriodNumEva.m
When the median starts indebted with respect to the average agent, he is poorer than average and therefore he consumes less and works more. Thus by subsidizing labor, he can redistributes income in his favor through the difference between the average labor supply and the labor supplied by the median agent However there is a limit to the amount of redistribution he can get since work hours are bounded above by 1.
The time path of the subsidies also affects the price of the borrowed asset, such that when the median subsidizes labor today more pronouncely than tomorrow's, the interests on the debt fall I DON'T KNOW WHY THOUGH (or q increases in our model), making it easier for the median to eventually repay his debt. In this way, the median can enjoy a higher consumption today (when it is most value since β < 1) than in the subsequent periods. The median could use this channel as long as:
1) some part of the debt is repaid since Ψ t (A tm ) is increasing or/and 2) Ψ t (A tm ) < Ψ t+1 (A t+1m ) (graph: Taxes in period 0, 1 and 2)
In the finite (3-p) horizon model, both things happen, but in the infinite horizon model, neither of them will because the median will roll over the initial debt without changing the principal, and the policy rule is stationary so Ψ t (A m ) = Ψ t+1 (A m ) = Ψ(A m ).
6 Conclusions: to be fixed
I DIDN'T DO ANYTHING HERE. GOOD NIGHT.
With this paper, we continue the groundwork which was begun in earlier studies and which is needed in order to develop a toolbox for analyzing dynamic macroeconomic models of political economy. We utilize recursive techniques heavily for defining equilibria and for computing these equilibria numerically. In terms of substantive results, we formalize a notion of aggregation in wealth levels and argue that, provided that preferences are in a certain class, a recursive dynamic politico-economic equilibrium will evolve as a function of mean and median wealth levels only: it will not depend on other features of the wealth distribution. We also study a special functional-form example and show that it is possible to solve for equilibria in closed form up to essentially one function of one variable. This allows us to apply a numerical procedure based on successively approximating the equilibrium functions with higher-order polynomial functions to a simple enough case that the numerical procedure itself can be evaluated in detail. This evaluation has only begun, and it will be a central theme of the future work in this line of research, since full-blown macroeconomic models will not admit simplification of this sort: typical macroeconomic models will feature a number of unknown functions, each with at least two arguments. The aggregation result is crucial in maintaining a lowdimensional state variable, but even with this simplification much work is necessary to perfect the numerical methods.
Appendix
to be completed. . . WE SHOULD CITE THE SJE PAPER HERE.
